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Abstract: According to Millianism, the meaning of a name is ex-
hausted by its referent. According to anti-realism about fictional en-
tities, there are no such entities. If there are no fictional entities, how 
can we explain the apparent meaningfulness of fictional names? Our 
best theory of fiction, Walton’s theory of make-believe, makes the 
same assumptions but lacks the theoretical resources to answer the 
question. In this paper, I propose a pragmatic solution in terms of 
two main dimensions of meaning, a subjective, psychological dimen-
sion and an intersubjective, public dimension. The psychological di-
mension builds on the notion of mental files; the public dimension 
builds on Stalnaker’s notion of common ground. The account is co-
herent with two main theoretical principles, parsimony and uni-
formity. Furthermore, it satisfies three explanatory conditions posed 
by the intentionality of our thought and discourse about fiction, ob-
ject-directedness, counterfictional imagining and intersubjective iden-
tification. 
Keywords: Fictional names, mental files, common ground, make-be-
lieve, Mill, Walton, Stalnaker. 
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1. Introduction 
 I assume that there are no fictional entities of any peculiar kind, no fic-
tional people, no fictional places and no fictional objects. Yet, we talk about 
Desdemona, Middle-earth, Hop-o’-My-Thumb and the magic Seven League 
Boots. For example, we say that Desdemona is a Venetian beauty, that Mid-
dle-earth is the central continent on Earth, that Hop-o’-My-Thumb steals the 
Seven League Boots from the sleeping giant. If there are no fictional entities, 
how can we explain the apparent meaningfulness of fictional names such as 
‘Desdemona,’ ‘Middle-earth,’ ‘Hop-o’-My-Thumb,’ and ‘Seven League 
Boots’? This is the question I want to address in this paper. 
 Fictional names are names of the same semantic type as proper names, 
such as my name and your name, names of places such as ‘Barcelona’, 
names of things such as ‘the Hindenburg’. Proper names are expressions 
that refer to something or at least are used under the presupposition that 
they refer to something. The philosophical debate on the semantics of 
proper names ideally divides in two main streams. The first started with 
Mill (1843), who considered the contribution of a proper name to language 
exhausted by its individual referent. According to standard versions of this 
view, understanding the meaning of a name comes down to some direct 
causal epistemic relation to its individual referent. The second was roughly 
initiated by Frege (1892), who argued that the contribution of a proper 
name to language is some kind of descriptive information that determines 
the referent of a name, if any. According to this view, understanding a name 
consists in grasping the relevant descriptive information. Correspondingly, 
there are two main views on the semantics of fictional names. According to 
Millianism, fictional names contribute their referents, if any, to the truth 
conditions of sentences containing them. According to descriptivism, they 
contribute properties and relations that determine their referents, if any. I 
assume that there are no fictional entities, hence names such as ‘Desde-
mona’ are referring expressions without referents. Nevertheless, I will argue 
that the correct semantics for discourse about fictional characters is Millian. 
 There are two standard objections against Millianism for names without 
referents, which regard the apparent meaningfulness of empty names and 
the meaningfulness of sentences containing them. The problem of the 
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meaningfulness of names is based on the premise that if someone under-
stands a name, then she knows its semantic content. But names without 
referents have no semantic content. If fictional names have no referents and 
Millianism is true, they have no meaning. Yet, ordinary speakers judge them 
to be fully meaningful. Therefore, Millianism for names without referents 
must be false. The problem of the meaningfulness of sentences is based on 
the premise that if someone understands a sentence containing a name, then 
she knows its semantic content. But names without referents contribute 
nothing to the semantic content of sentences. If names like ‘Desdemona’ 
contribute nothing to the semantic content of sentences, and Millianism is 
true, then sentences containing them have no semantic content either. Yet, 
speakers judge them to be fully meaningful. Therefore, Millianism for names 
without referents must be false. 
 Standard solutions to the problem of the meaningfulness of sentences 
appeal to gappy propositions (Adams and Stecker 1994; Braun 2005; Friend 
2011; Salis 2013a). The idea is that sentences containing non-referring 
names express incomplete propositions that are structurally similar to fully 
fledged propositions. On this proposal, a sentence such as ‘Desdemona was 
a Venetian beauty’ expresses an incomplete proposition having a gap in 
subject position and a property in predicate position, canonically repre-
sented as <__, being-a-Venetian-beauty>. Obviously, the main advantage 
of gappy proposition theories is that they preserve the structural similarity 
between sentences involving referring names and those involving non-refer-
ring names. The main disadvantage is that they do not have the theoretical 
resources to distinguish between different sentences intuitively having dif-
ferent meanings (and truth-conditions) but expressing the same gappy prop-
osition, e.g., ‘Desdemona was a Venetian beauty’ and ‘Othello was a Vene-
tian beauty.’ Something else must be key to an explanation of this datum. 
Proponents of gappy proposition theories usually build on solutions they 
offer to the problem of the meaningfulness of names.  
 Standard solutions to the problem of the meaningfulness of names have 
been put forward in terms of further types of meaning at the cognitive 
level.1 These solutions distinguish between the semantic content of linguistic 
                                                 
1  Millianism can be interpreted as a particularly strong version of referentialism, 
the view according to which the semantic contribution of a name is its referent, if it 
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expressions, including names, and the cognitive relations speakers bear to 
names. The idea is that ordinary speakers bear cognitive relations to non-
referring names that are similar to those they bear to referring names. On 
one such proposal, the relevant type of similarity is cast in terms of the 
causal relation with information inputs, mental states and behavioural out-
puts (Braun 2005). On a slightly different proposal, the relevant type of 
similarity is cast in terms of the notion of mental files, which are cognitive 
representations of (real or fictional) individuals (Friend 2011, 2014; Salis 
2013a). Coherently with Millianism, mental files involve qualitative infor-
mation associated to names or other singular linguistic expressions that 
contribute to the cognitive meaning associated to names but not to their 
semantic content. The main advantage of these proposals is that they pre-
serve the intuitive similarities between thoughts about concrete objects and 
fictional objects, independently of any ontological commitment to their ex-
istence. The main drawback is that by locating the explanation of the mean-
ingfulness of names in the mind of speakers, these proposals risk to under-
mine the intersubjective construction of meaning that is essential to our 
engagement with works of fiction. Effectively, these solutions are psycholo-
gistic in spirit.2  
 In this paper I want to develop a pragmatic account of the meaningful-
ness of fictional names that combines two aspects of meaning, social—or 
intersubjective—and psychologistic—or subjective. The underlying assump-
tion is that fiction is a communicative effort, namely a social interaction 
between an author (or, possibly, group of authors) and an audience. Key to 
this account is the recognition that fictional names are introduced in works 
                                                 
has one. Alternative, more liberal versions of referentialism recognise that proper 
names can have further dimensions of meaning, including linguistic, cognitive, and 
pragmatic, that are also truth-conditional. For example, Perry’s (2001) critical refe-
rentialism submits that an utterance of a proper name comes equipped with a con-
ventional reflexive content that makes reference to the utterance itself. I don’t have 
the space to discuss this (or similar proposals) here. But I invite the reader to have 
a look at Salis (2013a) for a critical discussion of Perry’s information based account 
of the meaning of empty names, which is integral to his critical referentialism.  
2  See Maier (2017) for a recent development of a fully psychologistic semantics of 
fictional discourse that is inspired by Kamp (1990) and relies on the analogous notion 
of internal anchors. 
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of fiction that function as scaffolding for the construction of intersubjective 
meaning. The best account of fiction is Walton’s (1990) theory of fiction as 
a game of make-believe. This theory, however, does not offer any solution 
to the problem of the meaning of fictional names. Following Stalnaker 
(2002), I will argue that the social, intersubjective dimension of meaning 
can be spelled out in terms of the notion of common ground.3 This social 
dimension can be integrated with a psychologistic, subjective dimension of 
meaning spelled out in terms of the notion of mental files. On this view, 
fiction is a form of social interaction that effects the mental representations 
of its consumers. The author of fiction tells a story that encourages certain 
imaginings via the use of intersubjectively available linguistic tools. These 
tools are created for the purpose of encouraging imagining in certain ways 
and provide the manifest basis for the acquisition of information that can 
be shared by consumers of fiction and stored in mental representations.  
2. What account of fictional names?  
 Addressing the key question of this paper requires that we first identify 
the criteria by which we want to evaluate a theory of fictional names. The 
most important criteria are two theoretical requirements, parsimony and 
uniformity, and three explanatory conditions, object-directedness, counter-
fictional imaginings, and intersubjective identification. Let us begin by con-
sidering the theoretical requirements.  
 According to the theoretical principle of parsimony, we should reject 
any unnecessary commitment to the existence of fictional entities. We face 
the initially intuitive datum that fictional entities do not exist as ordinary 
physical objects. For example, we say that Desdemona does not exist and 
that Middle-earth is just a fiction. Depending on the interpretation we give 
of this datum, we divide between realists and antirealists about fictional 
entities. Fictional antirealists take the nonexistence datum at face value 
                                                 
3  Geurts (2017) suggests that fiction is a form of communication and describes the 
possibility of developing what he calls an ecumenical account (one that combines 
interpersonal and psychologistic dimensions of meaning) in terms of negotiating 
commitments.  
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and argue that there are no fictional entities (Everett 2007, 2013; Sainsbury 
2010; Walton 1990). Fictional realists believe that there are fictional entities 
and explain the nonexistence datum in different ways depending on their 
preferred metaphysics of fiction. Upholders of fictional Meinongianism dis-
tinguish between being and existence and argue that there are non-existent 
objects (Berto 2011; Castañeda 1990; Priest 2005; Rapaport 1978; Voltolini 
2006). Abstract object theorists posit a difference between concrete and 
abstract existence and argue that fictional entities are abstract entities that 
do not exist as concrete objects (Currie 1988, 1990; van Inwagen 1977; 
Thomasson 1999). Fictional possibilists argue that fictional entities are 
merely possible objects that do not exist at the actual world (Lewis 1978, 
1986).  
 The debate on the ontology of fiction is ripe with controversy and none 
of the linguistic and ontological arguments that fuel the ongoing discussion 
between realism and antirealism is conclusive.4 There is, however, one the-
oretical consideration that, in my opinion, trumps realism. Whatever data 
realists about fictional entities present, antirealists can provide equally 
plausible explanations that avoid ontological commitment to fictional enti-
ties. If there are alternative plausible explanations of the same data that do 
not require the postulation of disputed entities, then there is no need to 
commit to their existence. That is, fictional entities are dispensable. In par-
ticular, as I will argue, we do not need them to account for the meaningful-
ness of fictional names.   
 According to the theoretical principle of uniformity, fictional names have 
the same meaning across different types of discourse about fiction. It is 
common to distinguish between two main types of fictional discourse, intra-
fictional and extra-fictional. Intra-fictional discourse is discourse we perform 
from within the fiction, from a participatory or internal perspective. This 
kind of discourse is commonly interpreted as involving a mental attitude of 
imagination and a conniving use of language, one wherein the utterer en-
gages in pretence or make-believe.5 For example, in storytelling and in re-
ports about the content of fictional stories we say that Desdemona was a 
Venetian beauty and that Middle-earth is the central continent on Earth. 
                                                 
4  See Salis (2013b) for a detailed review of these disputes. 
5  The expression ‘conniving’ was introduced by Evans (1982). 
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Extra-fictional discourse, on the other hand, is the sort of discourse we 
perform from without the fiction, from a descriptive or external perspective. 
In this case, we assume an attitude of belief and we perform a non-conniving 
use of language, one wherein the utterer engages in serious assertion that 
can be assessed for truth and falsity. For example, in meta-fictional dis-
course we believe that, according to Shakespeare’s Othello, Desdemona was 
a Venetian beauty. Other types of discourse about fictional characters raise 
disputes between realists and antirealists. Realists usually construe literary 
criticism as extra-fictional discourse and claim that such discourse is com-
mitted to the existence of fictional entities. Among their favourite examples 
are sentences such as ‘Desdemona is a fictional character’, or ‘Desdemona 
was created by Shakespeare’, which seem to be straightforwardly true. Anti-
realists reject this interpretation and extend the notion of intra-fictional 
discourse to literary criticism in ways that I will explain in the next Sec-
tions.  
 There are two main accounts of the meaning of fictional names in intra-
fictional and extra-fictional discourse, mixed and uniform. According to the 
mixed account, fictional names are rigid non-designators (they have no ref-
erent, neither actual nor possible) when uttered by the author of fiction in 
intra-fictional discourse; they are rigid designators (they refer to the same 
entity in all possible worlds) when used by readers and critics in extra-
fictional discourse that seem to commit us to the existence of fictional en-
tities (Currie 1988, 1990; Kripke 1980, 2013; Van Inwagen 1977). The first 
use is ontologically foundational (it is the use through which fictional enti-
ties are created or selected among the range of fictional objects). The second 
use is parasitic on the first.  
 Mixed accounts face some well-known internal problems, which I won’t 
have space to rehearse here.6 Moreover, there is linguistic evidence against 
the purported ambiguity in the different uses of fictional names. For exam-
ple, we can say in one and the same breath that Desdemona was the daugh-
ter of Brabantio and a fictional character. This sentence is naturally inter-
preted as involving the attribution of two properties (being-the-daughter-
of-Brabantio and being-a-fictional-character) to the same individual  
                                                 
6  See Salmon (1998) for influential criticisms. 
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(Desdemona). The mixed account would have us interpret the only instance 
of the name ‘Desdemona’ in two ways, as a rigid non-designator (with re-
spect to the first property) and as a rigid designator (with respect to the 
second property). We, however, do not seem to make any such distinction. 
To reinforce this point, consider an analogous example where we say that 
Amie Thomasson is an American philosopher and a fictional character. This 
sentence is naturally interpreted as involving the attribution of two prop-
erties (being-an-American-philosopher and being-a-fictional-character) to 
the same individual (Amie Thomasson). This interpretation is as natural as 
the previous one. In each case, it seems that we are attributing different 
properties to one and the same individual. The postulated ambiguity of 
meaning in different uses of the same fictional name seems artificial and not 
backed up by the evidence. 
 Mixed accounts have been rejected as unnecessary by upholders of uni-
form accounts of fictional names, according to which fictional names have 
the same meaning in all discourse about fiction. Proponents of uniform ac-
counts divide between fictional realists and fictional antirealists. Realists 
hold that fictional names are rigid designators referring to fictional entities 
since their first use in storytelling (Salmon 1998; Thomasson 1999).7 Anti-
realists hold that fictional names are non-rigid designators throughout dis-
course about fiction (Walton 1990; Everett 2007, 2013). Uniform accounts 
offer a uniform semantics for fictional names according to which the name 
‘Desdemona’ is a rigid designator (realism) or a rigid non-designator (anti-
realism) throughout its different uses.  
 Realist uniform accounts seem to fare better than antirealist accounts 
with respect to the three explanatory conditions that a theory of fictional 
                                                 
7  Salmon argues that once one accepts that there are fictional entities, one better 
interprets uses of fictional names as referring to those entities. As he puts it: ‘Once 
fictional characters have been countenanced as real entities, why hold onto an alleged 
use of their names that fails to refer to them? It is like buying a luxurious Italian 
sports car only to keep it garaged’ (1998, 298). Similarly, Thomasson (1999) argues 
that storytelling is a sort of special performative speech act that immediately brings 
a fictional character into existence. Once the character is created, all uses of the 
name by the author in the story and by readers and critics refer back to the charac-
ter.  
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names must satisfy, object-directedness, counterfactual imaginings, and in-
tersubjective identification. These conditions emerge from Friend’s (2011, 
2014) considerations on the intentionality of our thought and discourse 
about fictional characters that upholders of fictional realism (in particular, 
Thomasson 1999) adduce in favour of the postulation of fictional entities. 
Effectively, these conditions pose a problem for upholders of antirealism.  
 Let us begin by considering object-directedness. Thoughts about Desde-
mona seem to be about Desdemona, not about Othello or Iago. They func-
tion like singular thoughts that are about a particular individual rather 
than about whoever is the Venetian beauty, daughter of Brabantio, and 
wife of Othello. In other words, when we think about Desdemona, we think 
about the fictional character herself rather than about whoever satisfies the 
set of descriptions associated to her name in the story. Realists can argue 
that it is by recognising the existence of fictional characters that we can 
account for the object-directedness of our thoughts about them. After all, 
how could our thoughts about Desdemona be about any particular individ-
ual if there is no Desdemona?  
 Second, we can engage in counterfictional imaginings about fictional 
characters, which involve a change in their properties. I can imagine that 
Desdemona may have had a different faith had she not met Othello, or that 
Middle-earth may have been a continent in the southern hemisphere. In 
these cases, we seem to imagine a particular entity as having properties 
that it does not really have. Realists can explain this phenomenon by pos-
tulating that our imaginings are about objects we can identify inde-
pendently of the properties they have in the world of the story. But how 
could antirealists account for the same phenomenon if there are no fictional 
entities?  
 Third, we can intersubjectively identify characters even when we dis-
agree about their properties. Was Hedda Gabler a victim of society, as a 
standard feminist interpretation suggests, or was she a true descendant of 
Iago and Edmund, as Harold Bloom (1999) has it? Did Hamlet suffer from 
an Oedipus complex, as suggested by Freud, or was he one of Shakespeare’s 
hero-villains, as argued by Bloom (2001)? Realists can explain this datum 
by postulating the existence of a fictional entity we can intersubjectively 
identify and disagree about. In fact, how could we intersubjectively  
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identify something that does not exist when we attribute different prop-
erties to it? 
 In the rest of this paper, I will develop a pragmatic account of the mean-
ing of fictional names that is coherent with parsimony and uniformity and 
that can satisfy the three explanatory conditions of intentionality. 
3. Walton’s fictions 
 Standard theories of fiction characterise it in terms of an invited re-
sponse of imagination or make-believe.8 Most upholders of this view define 
works of fiction in terms of a characteristic speech act of fictionalising—or 
fictive utterance—that would distinguish it from non-fiction (Currie 1990; 
Davies 1996; Lamarque and Olsen 1994; Stock 2011, 2017). A fictive utter-
ance is defined in terms of a Gricean intention. The idea is that an author 
intends readers of fiction to imagine certain things, and that readers of 
fiction recognise this very intention and imagine accordingly. In contrast, 
non-fiction is defined in terms of an author’s speech act of assertion that 
invites belief. These proposals are inspired by Walton’s (1990) theory of 
fiction as make-believe. Walton himself, however, rejects the idea that fic-
tion be defined in terms of an author’s intention and suggests instead that 
an author’s storytelling involves mere pretend assertions. While I sympa-
thise with Gricean approaches to fiction, nothing much will hinge on 
whether we interpret the act of storytelling as a genuine speech act or as 
an act of pretend assertion here.  
 Central to Walton’s account of the nature of fiction is a fruitful analogy 
with children’s games of make-believe. On this proposal, make-believe is a 
social imaginative activity constrained by the use of props. Sometimes we 
imagine something without a particular reason. But some other times our 
imaginings are prompted by the presence of a particular object, in which 
case this object is referred to as a prop. Props are ordinary objects that 
                                                 
8  An exception is Friend (2012) who argues that fiction should be defined in terms 
of the relational, historical notion of genre. García-Carpintero (2013) replies, 
correctly in my view, that Friend’s argument fails to demonstrate that imagination 
is unnecessary to a characterisation of fiction.  
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make propositions fictional in virtue of there being a prescription to imagine 
something. Walton argues that any ordinary object can become a prop in 
virtue of the imposition of a rule, or principle of generation, prescribing 
what is to be imagined when presented with the object. If someone imagines 
something because she is encouraged to do so by the presence of a prop, she 
is engaged in a game of make-believe, and someone who is engaged in a 
game of make-believe is engaged in the activity of pretence.  
 It is natural to spell out the notion of truth in fiction—or fictionality—
in terms of fictional worlds. The idea is that in telling a fictional story, the 
author indicates or creates a fictional world that readers and critics subse-
quently explore through their imagination. To be true in the fiction is to be 
true in the world of the story. Some take this interpretation literally and 
argue that fictional truth is a variety of truth and that being fictionally 
true is being true at a possible (Lewis 1978) or impossible (Berto 2011; 
Priest 1997) world. On this view, utterances about fictional characters are 
genuine assertions that can be assessed for truth and falsity throughout 
different varieties of fictional discourse. Others, including Walton (1990), 
reject this idea and argue that fictional truth is not a variety of truth. 
Rather, it is a property of the propositions that are among the prescriptions 
to imagine in force in a fictional story. On this interpretation, utterances 
about fictional characters are pseudo assertions that can only be correct or 
incorrect.9 Both proposals face some well-known internal problems that we 
will have no space to discuss here.10 Most importantly, however, the former 
typically underestimates the role of imagination in fiction and it naturally 
combines with a realist interpretation of fictional entities.  
 So, on Walton’s notion, fictionality is a property of the propositions that 
are among the prescriptions to imagine of a certain game. The statement 
‘it is fictional that p’ is to be understood as ‘it is to be imagined that p’. In 
this sense, Walton’s notion of fictionality is both normative (it depends on 
the stipulation of rules that guide the imaginings of participants in the 
game) and objective (it is independent of the idiosyncratic imaginings of 
individual participants who may or may not imagine in conformity with a 
game’s prescriptions). Moreover, fictional truths divide into primary truths 
                                                 
9  See Eagle (2007) and Currie (1990) for similar views. 
10  See Woodward (2011) for a critical overview. 
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and implied truths, where the former generate from the original prescrip-
tions to imagine while the latter generate indirectly from the primary truths 
via further principles of generation. 
 In one of Walton’s favourite examples, children play a game where they 
pretend that tree stumps are bears. In this game, tree stumps are props 
that prescribe certain imaginings in virtue of the original prescription to 
imagine (that tree stumps are bears) and further principles of generation. 
So, for example, when children see a tree stump in the woods, they imagine 
that there is a bear in the woods, and if someone lassoes a tree stump, they 
imagine that someone catches a bear. Furthermore, some imaginings may 
be shared by all participants in the game, while others may not. If there is 
a tree stump hidden behind a bush and nobody can see it, it will be fictional 
that there is a bear hidden behind the bush even if nobody imagines so. 
Walton calls this type of game of make-believe unofficial, in the sense that 
the rule that generates it is ad hoc. Other games, however, involve stable 
and conventional rules and for this reason Walton calls them authorised. 
These games involve props that have been created for the purpose of pre-
scribing certain publicly recognised imaginings. For example, hobby horses 
and babydolls prescribe imagining horses or babies respectively. Props that 
have been originally introduced in authorised games of make-believe are 
what Walton calls ‘representations’.  
 Walton argues that the ability to engage in games of make-believe does 
not disappear when we become adults. In fact, he encourages us to interpret 
representational works of art, including literary works of fiction, as props 
that have been originally created for the purpose of generating certain 
games of make-believe. Literary works of fiction, in particular, are syntactic-
semantic entities that can be perceived through concrete copies of texts in 
printed, digital or audio versions. They prescribe certain imaginings in vir-
tue of an author’s prescriptions. When reading What Masie Knew, we im-
agine that Masie lives in London in virtue of Henry James’ prescription to 
imagine that this is the case. Further truths in the fiction can be generated 
from the primary truths via two main principles, the reality principle and 
the mutual belief principle. The reality principle keeps the world of the 
fiction as close as possible to the real world. From the primary fictional 
truth that Masie lives in London and our knowledge of Europe’s geography, 
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we can infer the implied fictional truth that Masie’s trip to France requires 
travelling on the Dover Calais ferry route. The mutual belief principle gen-
erates further implied truths by importing the mutual beliefs of members 
of the community in which the story originated. Many implied truths in 
Homer’s Iliad are generated against the ancient Greek mythological beliefs. 
While Walton does not explicitly recognise it, others have already noticed 
that make-believe has the flexibility to include further principles of genera-
tion that may depend on particular genres and literary conventions. Of 
course, there are cases where determining what is fictional is difficult. For 
example, did Edna, the main character in Chopin’s The Awakening, die by 
purposefully committing suicide or did she unintentionally got swept away 
in the waves? Did the governess in James’ The Turn of the Screw really see 
the ghosts of Miss Jessell and Peter Quint, or was she of unsound mind?  
Importantly, our appreciation of these stories may depend on the fact that 
the ambiguity cannot be solved. But in the vast majority of cases, we have 
a clear grasp of what is true in the fiction and what is not.  
 Someone who imaginatively engages with literary works of fiction plays 
an authorised game of make-believe. This is often the case in intra-fictional 
discourse such as producing reports about the content of the story. There 
are, however, other ways of developing a story within the imagination that 
constitute unofficial games of make-believe and can therefore be interpreted 
as further examples of intra-fictional discourse. A typical case is offered by 
literary critics’ practice of exploring a character’s properties from a partic-
ipatory perspective, as the natural continuation of stories, sometimes even 
in cross-fictional contexts. In these instances, critics talk about characters 
as if they were real, by predicting their behaviour, their thoughts, their 
feelings, comparing them to other characters and so on. Harold Bloom, re-
flecting on Hedda Gabler, the character, writes:  
Whether commanding an army or an arms factory, Hedda would 
have acted like her forerunners Iago and Edmund. Her genius, 
like theirs, is for negation and destruction … her intelligence is 
malign, not because of social circumstances but for her pleasure, 
for the exercise of her will. (quoted in Eagle 2007, 128)  
Although this kind of imaginings are the result of Bloom’s development of 
the story from a participatory perspective, none of them is among the  
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imaginings prescribed by the author or implicitly derivable from the story. 
They are moves in an unofficial game of make-believe. 
 Walton’s proposal fits well with the two theoretical principles of parsi-
mony and uniformity. It is ontologically parsimonious because while his 
framework is compatible with both realism and antirealism about fictional 
entities, Walton voices his preference for an antirealist account of fiction. 
Games of make-believe can involve imaginings about real objects and fic-
tional objects. But imaginings do not commit us to postulate any fictional 
entities. Imagining a flying donkey does not commit one to the existence of 
a flying donkey. Moreover, the account is uniform because Walton suggests 
that fictional names are rigid non-designators in all their uses. He assumes 
a Millian account of names and recognises that fictional names have no 
referents and cannot contribute anything to the truth conditions of  
sentences. In fact, Walton argues that statements involving fictional names 
express no propositions and have no truth-conditional content. On this 
view, they are not descriptions of states of affairs but prescriptions to im-
agine in certain ways.  
 Walton’s analysis inherits the problems of a Millian semantics for fic-
tional names and it therefore fails to satisfy the explanatory conditions of 
object-directedness, counterfictional imaginings, and intersubjective iden-
tification. How can our thoughts and discourse about Hedda Gabler or 
any other fictional character be directed at any particular individual if 
Hedda does not exist? How can we imagine that Desdemona might have 
been different from the way she is in Shakespeare’s Othello if there is no 
Desdemona? And how can we intersubjectively identify and even disagree 
about the properties of a fictional character if there isn’t one? In the next 
three sections, I will develop an answer to these questions within the 
make-believe framework by appealing to the notions of mental files and 
common ground.  
4. Mental files and the subjective meaning of names   
 Recent accounts of fictional names coherent with Millianism and Wal-
ton’s account of fiction build on the recognition of the cognitive, psycholog-
ical and subjective meanings that speakers associate with names. A key 
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notion in these accounts is that of a mental file. The notion is best intro-
duced with an example.  
 Sally and Mary meet Harry at a party in the philosophy department. 
Harry has red hair; he wears blue jeans and a yellow shirt. Sally assumes 
that he is a philosopher. When Sally meets Harry, she forms a mental file 
HS collecting all information she takes to be true of Harry. HS is informed 
by the encounter, but it needs not involve exclusively information that is 
true of Harry. HS contains Sally’s personal perspective on Harry, which can 
but need not be the same as the set of properties he satisfies. Sally does not 
realise that Harry is Australian (she does not recognise his accent), and she 
does not know that he is not a philosopher, but a neuroscientist. Her mental 
file differs from the set of properties satisfied by Harry in all these respects. 
Mary learns about Harry from a common friend, Bob, who tells her that 
he’s going to take a friend, a neuroscientist called Harry, to the party. So, 
Mary forms a mental file HM of Harry before the party, through conversation 
with Bob. When Mary meets Harry, she already knows that he is a neuro-
scientist, but she also recognises his accent and adds the information that 
he’s Australian to her file. Thus, the information she takes to be about 
Harry is partially different from the information Sally takes to be about 
Harry. Mary’s and Sally’s mental files HM and HS share some information 
(has red hair, wears blue jeans and a yellow shirt), but not other (is a 
neuroscientist, is Australian). Sally’s and Mary’s files are subjective and 
idiosyncratic in these respects.  
 Mental files are a philosopher’s construct that is akin to that of a con-
cept.11 They are organization structures for the storage of information that 
a subject takes to be about a concrete object represented as an individual 
rather than as the possessor of certain properties.12 Mental files can be 
formed in perception (like Sally’s encounter with Harry) or in communica-
tion (like Mary’s conversation with Bob). In both cases, there’s a causal 
relation between the individual source of information (Harry), which can be 
direct (in perception) or indirect (in communication chains).  
                                                 
11  Murez and Recanati (2016) emphasise the conceptual nature of mental files.  
12  Obviously, the notion of a cognitive representation is distinct and independent 
from Walton’s notion of representation as a prop in an authorised game of make-
believe.  
24  Fiora Salis 
Organon F 28 (1) 2021: 9–43 
 Since their inception mental files have been deployed in accounts of non-
referring names.13 Many have argued that mental files can lack referents 
and that the information stored in a mental file does not commit one to the 
existence of any particular object (Friend 2011, 2014; Perry 2001; Recanati 
2012). In fact, one may conjecture a sort of teleological argument for the 
possibility that mental files lack a referent.14 Mental files are produced by 
cognitive mechanisms that have survived because they are good at produc-
ing non-empty cognitive representations. An empty file counts as a mental 
file just like a malformed heart that cannot perform the function of pumping 
blood is nevertheless a heart. The French physicist Le Verrier hypothesised 
that there existed a planet called ‘Vulcan’ that was responsible for the ob-
served perturbations in Mercury’s orbit. Le Verrier theorised about Vulcan, 
he searched for it through astronomical observations and exchanged infor-
mation and ideas with colleagues about Vulcan. He collected a large fund 
of information in a mental file about Vulcan, which really did not exist.  
 Something different, however should be told of mental files for fictional 
objects. In this case there does not seem to be anything corresponding to 
the idea of a malformation. Empty mental files of fictions may serve another 
function. As all other mental files, they are structures in which speakers 
store and organise information, but this is to track objects in pretence, as 
an exercise of the imagination. A mental file for Desdemona is formed while 
reading a copy of Shakespeare’s play Othello. As I will argue in the next 
section, writing and reading fiction constitute a communicative effort in 
which mental files are formed even without a direct or indirect causal rela-
tion with the individual referent of the file. This type of causal relation is 
merely imagined. Something else, however, is needed to guarantee that dif-
ferent speakers engaging with the fiction form mental files about the same 
fictional individuals. I’ll indicate my preferred solution to this issue in Sec-
tion 6.   
 Information contained in mental files can be construed as a list of pred-
icates that a speaker takes as satisfied by the individual referent of the file. 
                                                 
13  Grice originally introduced the notion under the name ‘dossier’ in his Vacuous 
Names (1969). 
14  A similar argument was proposed by Sainsbury (2005) in relation to his notion 
of individual concepts, which I take to be analogous to mental files. 
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Predicates can be relational, and thus involve other mental files. As a con-
sequence, two files could appear in each other’s list. This happens, for in-
stance, when a file involves a proper name. When Mary thinks that Harry 
is Bob’s friend, she deploys two mental files, the mental file HM containing 
the information ‘is Bob’s friend’, and the mental file BM, which she associ-
ates to the name ‘Bob’. Effectively, there can be a hierarchy of files, but 
the files themselves contain only information (predicates) about Harry and 
Bob. They are associated to singular terms without including them. More-
over, mental files are not constituted or identified by their predicates and 
corresponding properties. The properties are merely associated with the file, 
and information can be added to and deleted from the file without changing 
the file itself. The day after the party, Sally and Mary chat about Harry. 
Eventually Sally learns that Harry is a neuroscientist, not a philosopher. 
She therefore updates her fund of information about Harry. She deletes the 
predicate ‘is a philosopher’ and adds the predicate ‘is a neuroscientist’ to 
HS. 
 As far as the information stored in the mental file can be updated, no 
specific information is essential to the identity of the file. However, there 
may be a persistent core of information about Harry that Sally will not 
withdraw and that may be essential to Harry. Sally’s mental file, for in-
stance, could preserve the information that Harry is human, that he is iden-
tical to himself, and that he is a concrete individual. But these are not 
properties that she can use to keep track of Harry or to distinguish him 
from other individuals. The information that she can use in these cases is 
probably inessential to Harry, which means that it can always be updated, 
subtracted or added through the history of the mental file. The fact that 
this kind of information is inessential makes it also inapt to be used to fix 
the referent of the file, and hence knowledge of the information stored in a 
mental file is not equivalent to knowledge of reference conditions. Percep-
tion and communication chains open a channel of information flow from 
object to subject, and the source of information is undoubtedly important, 
but there is no guarantee that the information is accurate. Hence, the notion 
of a mental file cannot be reduced to that of the information it contains. 
 Mental files work as modes of presentation of particular individuals, and 
so they play cognitive roles akin to Fregean senses. Hence, they contribute 
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a solution to the problem of the cognitive significance of names, which is 
the problem of explaining how one can have different thoughts about the 
same object without realising that one is thinking about the same object. 
In Frege’s classical example, one can think about Hesperus and Phosphorus 
in two distinct ways, as the morning star and as the evening star respec-
tively, possibly without realising that one is thinking about the very same 
planet, Venus. Similarly, a reader of Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr 
Jekyll and Mr Hyde can think about Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde in two distinct 
ways, as the kind doctor and the evil creature, without initially realising 
that they are the very same person. The solution in terms of mental files is 
that the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are associated with two distinct 
mental files each containing the relevant piece of information. One can be-
lieve that Hesperus will rise in the morning without believing that Phos-
phorus will rise in the morning because the names are associated with  
mental files involving different information. Similarly, the names ‘Dr Jekyll’ 
and ‘Mr Hyde’ are associated with different mental files. One can imagine 
that Dr Jekyll is a kind doctor without imagining that Mr Hyde is a kind 
doctor. Fregean senses are classically interpreted as descriptive modes of 
presentation that enter into the propositional content of sentences involving 
the relevant names. Mental files, however, are not necessarily interpreted 
in this way. The explanation in terms of mental files works at the level of 
thought, where mental files are the subjective components of an individual’s 
cognitive relation to a proposition (including a gappy proposition).  
 Like Fregean senses, mental files can also contribute an explanation to 
the problem of informative identities, which is the problem of explaining 
why it is informative to be told that Hesperus is Phosphorus, but not to be 
told that Hesperus is Hesperus; or why it is informative to be told that Dr 
Jekyll is Mr Hyde, but not to be told that Dr Jekyll is Dr Jekyll. There are 
two different accounts of this phenomenon based on two different operations 
on files, merging and linking. On the merging model, accepting an identity 
statement requires the unification of two files which become one (Strawson 
1974).15 On the linking model, accepting an identity statement requires the 
connection between files that remain distinct. Many have argued that the 
                                                 
15  The term ‘merging’ is introduced by Millikan (2000). 
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merging model is probably not adequate to describe the cognitive effects of 
many identity judgments. For example, Millikan (1997) argues that it 
would be risky to merge two files on the basis of an identity judgment that 
one may accept with less than 100% subjective probability, while the oper-
ation of linking may be less risky. Furthermore, the ability to distinguish 
between the different sets of information may be key to track objects and 
draw certain inferences. The ability to distinguish between Dr Jekyll and 
Mr Hyde purely in terms of their properties may be relevant to understand 
the battle between the good and the evil within Mr Jekyll. A better model 
would explain the phenomenon of informative identities in terms of the 
linking of a multiplicity of files for the same object or individual, in reality 
or in imagination.  
 Cases of recognition and identification show different things. First, they 
show that referents may be shared by different mental files. An agent who 
thinks of Hesperus may not know that it is identical to Phosphorus: she has 
two distinct files for the same individual object. Similarly, someone who 
imagines Dr Jekyll may not know that she is imagining Mr Hyde. Second, 
they show that referents cannot be changed: a mental file has its referent 
forever, if any. There are two reasons for this claim, internal coherence and 
misidentification.16 An individual object imposes certain conditions on the 
coherence of the information stored in its mental file. If the predicate ‘is F’ 
belongs to the mental file for x, then ‘is not F’ cannot belong to the same 
mental file, otherwise we would have inconsistent information about the 
same individual. If the referent of a file could change, there would be no 
constraint on updating information. This is especially relevant when the 
attitude one has toward the information contained in the file is belief. Co-
herence and consistency, however, may not always be required in imagina-
tion. For instance, there may be a mental file for the round square, even 
though the information ‘is round’ and ‘is not round’ is contradictory.  
 Another reason why the referent of a file cannot change is misidentifi-
cation. Suppose that Harry has a twin brother, Barry. Sally meets Harry 
first and forms an individual concept of him. Then she meets Barry, but 
she does not know that Barry is Harry’s twin brother. Sally thinks that she 
                                                 
16  These considerations are based on Sainsbury’s (2010) similar account of indivi-
dual concepts, which are cognitive entities akin to mental files.  
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meets Harry again. She falsely believes that the individual she meets is 
Harry, while in fact he is Barry. She sees Barry for some time, and never 
sees Harry again. Now, is Sally’s mental file about Harry or about Barry? 
We have two options. Either we say that Sally’s mental file of Harry has 
shifted its reference to Barry or we say that, when Mary meets Barry, she 
forms a new mental file with a different referent. The first option, on which 
an individual mental file can change its referent, requires that we fix the 
referent by application. But we cannot fix the referent ex novo each time 
we use a mental file because in this case we could not give a systematic 
account of error and misidentification. If each time we misidentify an object, 
we just change the referent of the mental file there is no misidentification. 
Mental files can have at most one referent. If the same mental file applies 
to x and y, then x = y. If this were not the case, misidentification (and 
memory and recognition) could not be accounted for (barring confusion, of 
course).  
 In sum, mental files are cognitive representations of individual objects, 
if any, which function as Fregean modes of presentations. They contribute 
to explanations of well-known problems, including the cognitive significance 
of names, informative identities, recognition, identification and misidentifi-
cation of (real and fictional) objects. As cognitive representations, however, 
they are also subjective and idiosyncratic components of the meaning of 
names. Hence, an appeal to mental files cannot contribute an explanation 
of the intersubjective, social dimension of the meaning of fictional names 
and of discourse involving them. It is now time to explore also this dimen-
sion. 
5. Common ground and the imaginative stance  
 Storytelling is a communicative effort that involves two parties, the au-
thor of fiction and the audience. Successful communication requires that 
both author and audience share certain background information—or com-
mon ground. Stalnaker (1999) introduces an influential notion of common 
ground, which he bases on the concept of presupposition. Common ground 
is the body of information that is presumed to be shared by the participants 
in a discourse. Stalnaker (1973) gives a standard pragmatic characterisation 
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of presupposition as a proposition that a speaker presupposes at a given 
time in a discourse and on the basis of which she is disposed to act as if she 
takes its truth for granted and as if her audience recognises that she is doing 
so. He further explains that to presuppose something is a propositional at-
titude with a social dimension: 
To presuppose something is to take it for granted, or at least to 
act as if one takes it for granted, as background information—as 
common ground among the participants in the conversation. What 
is most distinctive about this propositional attitude is that it is a 
social or public attitude: one presupposes that φ only if one pre-
supposes that others presuppose it as well. (Stalnaker 2002, 701) 
 In this section, I will argue that we should assume a similar notion of 
common ground and pragmatic presupposition to develop an account of the 
social, intersubjective meaning of fictional names.  
 The standard analysis of common ground is usually couched in terms of 
belief. Common ground is common belief and what a speaker presupposes 
is what she believes that others believe. Thus, common belief is a property 
of a group, while speaker presupposition is a propositional attitude of the 
individual speaker. The common beliefs of participants in a conversation 
are the beliefs that they believe others share. For example, when having a 
conversation with a colleague, I may say: I cannot come to the seminar this 
afternoon, I have to collect my daughter from school. In this case, the pre-
supposition that is common belief of both parties (myself and my colleague) 
is that I have a daughter. I presuppose that I have a daughter and that my 
colleague believes that I have a daughter. My colleague presupposes that I 
have a daughter and that I believe that I have a daughter. Accommodation, 
or informative presupposition, would be required in a situation where my 
colleague does not know that I have a daughter before the speech act and 
comes to know that I have a daughter after the speech act. In this case, my 
colleague would infer that I have a daughter after the speech act if she 
believes that I am being honest. In this case, she will add the presupposition 
that I have a daughter to the common ground after the speech act. The 
speech act, the utterance, is what Stalnaker calls a ‘manifest event’ (2002, 
708), an event that is mutually recognised to have occurred by both parties 
in the conversation. 
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 Stalnaker notices that in some cases what is presupposed may be differ-
ent from what participants in the conversation believe. A more general no-
tion of acceptance is therefore needed. On this view, acceptance is a propo-
sitional attitude that encompasses beliefs and other attitudes that may con-
trast with belief, such as supposition, presumption, assumption, and, as I 
will argue, make-believe. Acceptance is an attitude one party in a conver-
sation assumes, perhaps for a limited time and only in the context of the 
conversation, when treating a proposition as true for a given purpose, ig-
noring the possibility that it may, in fact, be false. In the history class, 
teacher and students discuss the religious practices of ancient Rome and 
claim that the Romans worshipped Juno. Neither the teacher nor the stu-
dents believe that Juno exists, yet they presuppose that there was such a 
goddess. They accept that Juno exists, ignoring the falsity of this proposi-
tion for the purpose of the conversation. It is common ground that Juno 
exists, and they believe that they accept that Juno exists, and they believe 
that all believe that all accept that Juno exists, etc.  
 Coherently with this framework, Sainsbury (2010) develops an account 
of fictional discourse and fictional truth in terms of acceptance and presup-
position relative truth. On this view, we can evaluate the Juno sentence as 
true relative to the shared presupposition that there is such a goddess as 
Juno, which we know to be false. Similarly, we can evaluate a sentence like 
‘Desdemona is a Venetian beauty’ with respect to the presupposition that 
there is such a Venetian beauty as Desdemona, which we accept (without 
believing it) for the purpose of engaging with the fiction. Sainsbury argues 
that the notion of presupposition-relative truth is independent of fiction, 
and this is an advantage of the view because ‘it’s not an ad hoc device 
designed to insulate an irrealist [read: antirealist] from problems special to 
fiction’ (Sainsbury 2010, 146).  
 Another advantage of this proposal is that the notion of acceptance nat-
urally extends to other types of discourse about fiction. Consider a compar-
ison between fiction and reality such as ‘Desdemona is a Venetian beauty, 
and she is more famous than any other real Venetian beauty’. If we regard 
the comparative sentence as true, presumably we do it with respect to the 
presupposition that Desdemona exists. This, however, would imply that her 
fame is greater than itself. Sainsbury’s solution is to recognise that most 
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uses of ‘real’ bring in some kind of metaphysical contrast, and that in this 
case the contrast is between reality and fictionality. The comparison is be-
tween a fictional character and real individuals. And while the realist would 
interpret it in terms of absolute truth, the antirealist would interpret it in 
terms of truth relative to the presupposition that there are fictional char-
acters, which she would accept without believing. 
 While Sainsbury presents his antirealist account as alternative to Wal-
ton’s theory of fiction as make-believe, I see it as one that can be specified 
in a way that makes it compatible with it. The propositional attitude of 
acceptance encompasses belief and other propositional attitudes that may 
contrast with belief. Acceptance is a neutral stance that one or more parties 
in a conversation hold toward a proposition in cases where they know that 
the proposition is true, in cases where they know that it is false, ad even in 
cases where they do not know whether the presupposed proposition is true 
or false (for example, agnostics may find themselves in the latter situation 
when they engage in conversations about god). As such, acceptance is too 
broad to capture the specificity of our characteristic attitude toward fiction. 
As stated above, standard theories of fiction define it in terms of imagina-
tion or make-believe. And Stalnaker recognises that pretence could be one 
of the specifications of acceptance. So, what we need is a specification of 
acceptance in its imaginative variety. 
 The notion of imagination that is relevant in this context, and that is 
compatible with Stalnaker’s (and Sainsbury’s) notion of acceptance, is prop-
ositional imagination, which is an ability to entertain alternative (possible 
or impossible) states of affairs, scenarios and situations, with or without 
forming a mental image. This is an attitude that is typically characterised 
by three minimal core features emerging from the current literature on im-
agination in cognitive science and philosophy of mind, freedom, quarantin-
ing, and mirroring.  
 Imagination manifests freedom in virtue of its being typically uncon-
strained by reality (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002; Nichols and Stich 2000; 
Velleman 2000). This feature provides the key criterion for the specification 
of the imaginative variety of acceptance as distinct from belief. To believe 
that p is to hold p as true at the actual world, and whether the actual world 
makes p true or false is not up to us. To imagine that p, however, does not 
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commit us to the truth of p. We can imagine spontaneously, in dream and 
daydreams, without guiding the imagination in a conscious way. Or we can 
imagine at will, as when we engage in the activity of supposition and coun-
terfactual reasoning for the purpose of exploring alternative scenarios. 
When these activities involve props, they become games of make-believe 
involving participants who together can make up their own rules. This fits 
well with the practice of story-telling, which combines a spontaneous imag-
inative effort (often described as inspiration) with a guided imaginative 
effort of conscious construction of a story through the generation of a text, 
the prop. In standard cases, the audience’s imaginings will be encouraged 
and guided by the author’s activity of storytelling via the mediation of the 
text.  
 Imagination manifests mirroring when it carries inferential commitments 
that are analogous to those carried by belief (Gendler 2003; Leslie 1987; 
Perner 1991; Nichols and Stich 2000; Nichols 2004, 2006). As propositional 
attitudes, belief and imagination can engage the same inferential mecha-
nisms of reasoning taking propositions as their inputs. If I believe that p, 
and I believe that if p then q, then I believe that q. Similarly, if I imagine 
that p, and I imagine that if p then q, then I imagine that q. The inferences 
we make when we believe and when we imagine a certain proposition de-
pend on background assumptions and on the specific aims and interests 
that direct our reasoning. Thus, a realistic story naturally imports many 
factual truths from the actual world, based on our shared knowledge of 
reality. An epic poem imports the mutual beliefs of the particular society 
where the poem originates. A fantasy story relies on different sets of back-
ground knowledge based on the particular rules of this genre. Some other—
perhaps more interesting—cases rely on the cultural background of the in-
terpreter, and may become the subject of disputes and controversies among 
literary critics, as in the examples of critical disagreement mentioned above.  
 Imagination manifests quarantining to the extent that its content is typ-
ically sealed off from belief (Gendler 2003; Leslie 1987; Nichols and Stich 
2000; Perner 1991). That is, imagining that p does not entail believing that 
p. More generally, imaginings prompt affective responses and desires that 
are limited to a particular episode of imagination and they do not guide 
action in the real world. When reading Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, we may 
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feel sorry for Anna and we may even want that she not dies. But these 
emotions and desires do not motivate us to act in any of the ways we would 
expect in normal circumstances. Moreover, fictional presuppositions are not 
apt for transformation into belief. And it is often inappropriate to explicitly 
cancel an imagined presupposition, because objecting to a story on the 
grounds of untruth is to cancel a presupposition that no one (unless misin-
formed) was going to adopt. Quarantining, however, does not imply that 
nothing of real-world relevance can be learned from an episode of imagina-
tion. We can learn many historical facts from reading Gore Vidal’s historical 
fiction Julian (which recounts the rise and rule of the Roman emperor Jul-
ian) if we export the relevant information from the imaginative context 
created by the novel onto reality.  
 In sum, imagination is a variety of acceptance that is distinct from belief 
and that is characterised by three main features, freedom, mirroring and 
quarantining. More specific varieties of propositional imagination can be 
spelled out in terms of more specific conditions.17 In particular, Walton 
characterises make-believe as a social imaginative activity involving the use 
of props. This type of imagination is not only a cognitive ability, but an 
imaginative activity involving different parties who can share the same im-
aginings via the use of props. These imaginings constitute the intersubjec-
tive, interpersonal meanings associated with fictional names and provide 
the foundation for the subjective meanings stored in the relevant mental 
files.  
6. The meanings of fictional names 
 According to Millianism, names without referents do not have any se-
mantic content. Yet fictional names seem to be fully meaningful. Now we 
can pull together the resources developed in the previous Sections to explain 
how the proposed account of the meaningfulness of names can satisfy the 
five desiderata identified in Section 2. 
 Storytelling is a communicative effort between the author of fiction and 
the audience. The author prescribes the audience to imagine in certain ways. 
                                                 
17  See Salis and Frigg (2020) for possible further specifications. 
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The audience imagines accordingly through the recognition of the author’s 
prescriptions to imagine. This recognition is afforded by the use of props, 
which are ordinary objects that are publicly and intersubjectively available 
to participants in games of make-believe. In particular, literary works of 
fiction are props that were created by their author for the specific purpose 
of encouraging certain imaginings. They are representations that afford and 
constrain an audience’s imaginings in virtue of their being concrete and 
intersubjectively available objects. The concrete character of a literary 
work of fiction is explained in terms of its smallest component units, par-
ticular marks on paper (or on a screen), which compose meaningful lin-
guistic expressions and constitute the larger unit that is the text. Fictional 
names—or, better said, concrete instances thereof—are some of the mean-
ingful linguistic expressions functioning as props within the larger prop 
that is the text. Their uses in fictional discourse support and encourage 
imaginings about fictional entities even though there are no such entities. 
Like all props, fictional names are perceptible entities that are originally 
created for the purpose of encouraging certain imaginings. In other words, 
they are representations (in Walton’s sense) that are mutually recognised 
by participants in the communicative effort in virtue of their concrete char-
acter.  
 As argued above, fictional names do not contribute anything to the 
truth-conditional content of sentences involving them. This poses a problem 
for Millianism, which claims that the meaning of a name is exhausted by 
its individual referent. Explaining the meaningfulness of fictional names co-
herently with this view requires an appeal to two further pragmatic types 
of meaning, intersubjective and subjective. Intersubjective meaning is 
cached out in terms of the notion of common ground. Subjective meaning 
is cached out in terms of the notion of mental files.  
 Let us consider an example to illustrate these ideas in more detail. Ste-
venson’s The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde begins with the fol-
lowing sentence: 
Mr. Utterson the lawyer was a man of a rugged countenance that was 
never lighted by a smile; cold, scanty and embarrassed in discourse; 
backward in sentiment; lean, long, dusty, dreary and yet somehow lov-
able.  
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Participation in the communicative effort initiated by Stevenson’s storytell-
ing requires imaginatively entering into the presupposition that the story 
told is true, and then speaking under that presupposition. Coherently with 
the author’s prescriptions, the attitude an audience has toward that pre-
supposition is imagination. The reader may fail to grasp some of the pre-
scribed imaginings, so we cannot define reader’s and author’s engagement 
in the same make-believe as determined by the assumption of exactly the 
same set of presuppositions. What ultimately guarantees that readers en-
gage in the same make-believe is that they defer to the author’s storytelling. 
In the example, what is required is that they defer to Stevenson’s activity 
of storytelling.  
 The author of fiction uses fictional names as props that signal which 
presuppositions are in place. When reading the fiction, sentence after sen-
tence, chapter after chapter, the information flow initiated by Stevenson is 
accumulated into the set of presuppositions in place in the specific conver-
sational background created by the story. Among these presuppositions are 
those triggered by fictional names. In the example above, recognising Ste-
venson’s prescription to imagine requires presupposing that Mr Utterson 
exists. Both Stevenson and we, the readers, know that there is no particular 
man referred to by that name. Yet we add the proposition that Mr Utterson 
exists to the common ground. It is common ground that Mr Utterson exists, 
and we believe that we imagine that Mr Utterson exists, and we believe 
that all believe that all imagine that Mr Utterson exists, etc. Moreover, 
when reading the full sentence, we gather further information about Mr 
Utterson that we add to the common ground. For example, we add the 
propositions that Mr Utterson was a lawyer, that he was a man of a rugged 
countenance that was never lighted by a smile; that he was cold, scanty 
and embarrassed in discourse; that he was backward in sentiment; that he 
was lean, long, dusty, dreary and yet somehow lovable. All these are part 
of the common ground.  
 Of course, no individual reader will be able to store all that information 
in the common ground of the story. When reading about Mr Utterson, in-
dividual readers cluster the information they gather from the story in par-
ticular mental files. The information associated to the name Mr Utterson is 
stored in a mental file labelled with that very name. Each time a reader 
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meets that very name in the story or in conversations about Mr Utterson, 
she deploys the mental file labelled with that name. The information she 
associates with the name may be incomplete, or even inaccurate, or it may 
be integrated with further information that was not originally included in 
the story. For example, a reader with good imagistic abilities may enrich 
the information provided by Stevenson with mental images in different sen-
sory modalities. These additions, however, are not part of the common 
ground, but only of the particular file the reader associates with the name. 
This is coherent with the subjective and idiosyncratic ways in which speak-
ers gather, interpret, enrich, remember or even misremember information 
afforded by fictions.  
 Coherently with mirroring, the information that is part of the story and 
that enters the common ground can be integrated via further principles of 
generation of the kind indicated above. This usually requires that both  
author and audience share the relevant principles. Yet, this may not always 
be possible. Literary fictions are a sort of delayed form of communication, 
where the author tells a story to an audience that may receive it decades, 
centuries or even millennia after the original act of storytelling. And con-
troversies about the correctness or the relevance of particular interpreta-
tions are often left unsolved. And this is how things are and should be.  
 Coherently with quarantining, imaginings are non-committal. While 
everything that Stevenson says involves the relevant presuppositions, and 
the conversation as a whole is sensible only if it is understood as committed 
to those presuppositions, we do not commit to the presuppositions in a way 
that carries over to contexts outside the scope of the fiction. Also, our dis-
positions are not to take seriously the possibility that we could come to 
believe what is currently imagined. When we read fiction, we are not de-
ceived by the author’s storytelling. 
 Fictional names can be used in intra-fictional discourse and extra-fic-
tional discourse. With the exception of meta-fictional statements, which 
involve serious assertions and an attitude of belief, most other cases can be 
interpreted as involving conniving uses of language and an attitude of im-
agination. Thus, conniving uses of fictional names in storytelling, fictional 
reports and participatory criticism trigger the usual presupposition (e.g., 
there is such an individual as Mr Utterson), which is imagined by speaker 
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and audience in the relevant games of make-believe (authorised in the first 
two instances, unofficial in the third). Similar treatment applies to cases 
that are usually taken as evidence for fictional realism. For example, an 
utterance of ‘Mr Utterson is a fictional character’ involves a conniving use 
of the name ‘Mr Utterson’, which triggers the presupposition that there is 
such an individual as Mr Utterson for the purpose of cancelling it with the 
predicate ‘is a fictional character.’ And this is tantamount to convey the 
proposition that Mr Utterson does not exist. An utterance of ‘Charlotte 
Brontë created Jane Eyre’ involves a conniving use of the name ‘Jane Eyre,’ 
which triggers the presupposition that there is a fictional character such as 
Jane Eyre, but also the presupposition that Charlotte Brontë wrote a fic-
tional story about a woman called Jane Eyre. One who does not know that 
Charlotte Brontë wrote a fictional story about a woman called Jane Eyre 
will learn this after the speech act, if she takes the speaker to be honest. In 
this case, we have a case of accommodation. With some flexibility, similar 
interpretations can be provided for similar cases depending on the context 
of utterance and mental states of participants in the conversation.  
 The account I just sketched clearly satisfies the two theoretical princi-
ples of parsimony and uniformity. It is parsimonious because it does not 
require the postulation of any fictional entities. It is uniform because it 
offers the same semantic interpretation of fictional names as rigid nondesig-
nators throughout their uses in different types of fictional discourse. Fur-
thermore, the account has the resources to satisfy the three conditions re-
lated to the problem of the intentionality of thought and discourse about 
fictional characters.  
 Let us start from the aboutness condition. We habitually think about 
fictional individuals and other fictional entities as if they were ordinary 
objects and yet there are no such objects. How can we explain the intuition 
that our thoughts and discourse about fictional characters are about some-
thing if there is no individual object to think about? Mental files offer a 
plausible solution because they contribute an explanation to the problem of 
object-directed yet objectless thought. When thinking about Desdemona, 
we deploy a mental file associated to her name. As we have seen, mental 
files are mental representations that stand for individual objects, without 
incurring any ontological commitments to real objects. Mental files are  
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organisation structures for the storage of information that someone takes 
to be about some particular object, independently of whether such an object 
exists. Mental files are usually associated with information that is about 
objects that exist. And so, it seems to us that whenever we deploy a mental 
file we think about a concrete object, even if there is no such object. 
Thoughts that seem to be about an object without there being one engage 
the same sort of cognitive resources as thoughts about concrete things. 
While there seems to be an object, this seeming object is just a construct 
of the imagination. And since imagination does not bring any ontological 
commitment, we can think about imaginary objects through mental files 
without committing to their existence.  
 An answer to the problem of counterfictional imaginings can build on 
similar resources. We not only think about fictional individuals as if they 
were concrete. We also engage in counterfictional imaginings about them. 
In other words, we imagine them as being different from the ways they are 
described in the original fictions. This usually involves changing some or 
most of their properties to explore the ways they could have been in some 
alternative, imagined scenarios distinct from the one specified by the fiction. 
Mental files explain how there seems to be an imaginary object that we can 
think about. Effectively, this seeming object is a construct of the imagina-
tion, without there really being one. In the imagination, however, we can 
explore and transform features of the imaginary object just like we would 
explore and transform features of a concrete object. What this actually 
means is that we only imagine to explore and transform the imaginary ob-
ject. And we do this by manipulating the information associated to the 
mental file. We usually keep fixed a certain amount of information (a cer-
tain subset of predicates) associated to the mental file for Anna Karenina, 
and change some other information to explore possible alternative ways she 
could have been. What we really do is shifting, adding, or deleting infor-
mation from the mental file for the imaginary object.  
 Finally, the account has also the resources to explain the problem of 
intersubjective identification. Speakers can disagree about certain features 
of fictional objects. But how can they seem to be talking about the same 
object if there isn’t one? While mental files can explain aboutness and coun-
terfictional imaginings with respect to individual speakers, they cannot  
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explain how different speakers can disagree about the same object when this 
does not exist. Fictional names as props come to rescue here. Fictional 
names are publicly and intersubjectively available objects that stand for 
particular fictional entities without any ontological commitment to their 
existence. They afford the recognition of the social and intersubjective 
meanings that are in the common ground of a particular communication 
exchange. Speakers can add or subtract propositions from the common 
ground by manipulating the information that is made available by the use 
of the same name. It is in virtue of using the name ‘Hamlet’ that Bloom 
can disagree with Freud’s interpretation of the same character. It is in vir-
tue of their participation in the same name-using practice, the one initiated 
by Shakespeare in the homonymous play, that Bloom and Freud can disa-
gree about the same fictional individual even if he does not exist.  
7. Conclusion 
 The integrated account sketched here provides a plausible, pragmatic 
explanation of the intuitive meaningfulness of fictional names. The under-
lying assumption is that fiction is a communicative effort between authors 
and their audiences. Communication is a social activity that requires man-
ifest and publicly accessible tools for the construction of intersubjective 
meanings. In fiction, these are the text of the story wherein fictional names 
are introduced. In Walton’s terms, they are props that afford and constrain 
an audience’s imaginings coherently with the author’s activity of storytell-
ing. Successful communication requires the notion of shared information, or 
common ground. This contributes to the intersubjective dimension of mean-
ing afforded by fictional names, and it further provides the foundation for the 
subjective dimension of meaning that is spelled out in terms of the notion of 
mental files. On this account, fiction is a form of communication that grounds 
the mental representations of involved parties. The author of fiction tells a 
story that encourages certain imaginings via the use of intersubjectively avail-
able linguistic tools. These tools are created for the purpose of encouraging 
imagining in certain ways and provide the manifest basis for the acquisition 
of information that can be shared and stored in mental representations. The 
account is ontologically parsimonious and semantically uniform. Moreover, 
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it provides the resources to explain key features of the intentionality of 
thought and discourse about fictional characters.  
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